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ABSTRACT
Bots, social media accounts controlled by software rather than by
humans, have recently been under the spotlight for their association
with various forms of online manipulation. To date, much work
has focused on social bot detection, but little attention has been
devoted to the characterization and measurement of the behavior
and activity of bots, as opposed to humans’. Over the course of the
years, bots have become more sophisticated, and capable to reflect
some short-term behavior, emulating that of human users. The goal
of this paper is to study the behavioral dynamics that bots exhibit
over the course of one activity session, and highlight if and how
these differ from human activity signatures. By using a large Twitter
dataset associated with recent political events, we first separate
bots and humans, then isolate their activity sessions. We compile
a list of quantities to be measured, like the propensity of users to
engage in social interactions or to produce content. Our analysis
highlights the presence of short-term behavioral trends in humans,
which can be associated with a cognitive origin, that are absent in
bots, intuitively due to their automated activity. These findings are
finally codified to create and evaluate a machine learning algorithm
to detect activity sessions produced by bots and humans, to allow
for more nuanced bot detection strategies.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Over the course of the last few years, social media have been con-
veying an ever increasing portion of human communications. At the
same time, research progress and increasing availability of cheap
hardware has brought the emergence of sophisticated forms of
artificial intelligence. The concurrence of these two factors is at the
root of the emergence of social bots, both as a field of investiga-
tion for the scientific community and as a topic of interest for the
generalist media and the society at large [2, 16].
Social bots are all those social media accounts that are controlled
by artificial, as opposed to human, intelligence. Their purposes can
be many: news aggregators, for example, collect and relay pieces
of news from different sources; chatbots can be used as automated
customer assistants. However, as a by now large number of studies
has shown, the vast majority of bots are employed as part of large-
scale efforts to manipulate public opinion or sentiment on social
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media, such as for viral marketing or electoral campaigns, often
with quantifiable effects [4, 18, 35].
In light of this fact, scholars’ efforts to investigate social bots can
roughly be grouped in two categories. On one side, many studies
have focused on the theme of bot detection, i.e., on how to recog-
nize bot accounts as such [8, 9, 11]. A second line of research deals
instead with the impact of the viral deployment of automated ac-
counts on large-scale social phenomena such as information spread
and sentiment manipulation [21, 28].
The characterization of bots’ behaviour is thus a topic that can
yield actionable insights, especially when considered in comparison
with humans’. Our present work examines an aspect of such com-
parison that, to the best of our knowledge, has not yet been explored
in detail in the existing literature: the short-term behavioural dy-
namics, i.e., the temporal evolution of behavioural patterns over the
course of an activity session of bots as opposed to that of humans.
Prior studies have examined the performance of human users when
engaging in continuous online interactions, finding measurable
changes, for example, in the amount of reactions to other users’
post, or in the quality (in terms of grammatical correctness and
readability) of the produced content [22, 29].
We hypothesize that such behavioural changes, if at all present,
should be starkly different in the case of bot accounts, when com-
pared with human counterparts. To investigate the matter, we an-
alyze a dataset of posts from the Twitter platform, focusing our
attention on the discussion preceding the 2017 French presidential
election. A previous study considered the role played by bot ac-
counts in that context, finding evidence of the presence of a large
number of such actors, working to create (or destroy) consensus
around specific candidates by means of (mis)information diffusion—
a phenomenon also observed in many other analogous events.
1.1 Contributions of this work
Over the course of single activity sessions, we measure different
quantities capturing user behaviour, e.g., propensity to engage in
social interactions, or amount of produced content, and finally
contrast results between bots and humans.
The present study advances our understanding of bots and hu-
man user behavior in the following ways:
• We reveal the presence of short-term behavioural trends
among humans that are instead absent in the case of bots.
Such trends may be explained by a deterioration of human
user’s performance (in terms of quality and quantity of pro-
duced content), and by an increasing engagement in social
interactions over the course of an online session; in both
cases, we would not expect bots to be affected, and indeed we
record no significant evidence of any short-term temporal
evolution for this category of users.
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• In the spirit of the research line on bot detection, we codify
our findings in a set of highly predictive features capable of
separating human activity sessions from bots’ ones; then, we
design and evaluate the performance of a machine learning
framework that leverages this features to detect bot activity
sessions. This can prove extremely desirable when trying to
detect so-called cyborgs, users that are in part controlled by
humans and in part bots. Our session classification system
yields an accuracy of 94% AUC (Area Under the ROC curve).
The addition of the features identified by our analysis yields
an average improvement over the baseline of up to 14% AUC.
2 DATA & METHODS
Our dataset consists of a collection of more than 16M tweets, posted
by more than 2M different users. The tweets were posted between
April 25 and May 7, 2017, the two-weeks period leading to the sec-
ond round of the French presidential election. A list of 23 keywords
and hashtags was manually compiled and used to collect the data
through the Twitter Search API.1
To classify the users between bots and humans, we employed
the Botometer API2 (previously known as BotOrNot [11]), which
provides a free-to-use, feature-based classification system. When
queried about a Twitter user name or user id, Botometer retrieves
from Twitter information about more than a thousand features
associated with that account, grouped into six categories: content,
friend, network, sentiment, temporal, and user meta data; the API
returns a bot score for each category, plus an overall score. A bot
score is a number representing the likelihood for the account to be
controlled by a bot, and it ranges from 0 (definitely human) to 1
(definitely bot).
Here, we used Botometer to calculate the bot score of more than
380k users in our dataset, namely all users who posted at least 5
tweets during the observation time, minus those whose account was
since deleted (27k), or which privacy setting prevented Botometer
to access the necessary information (15k accounts). The 380k users
are responsible for more than 12M out of the overall 16M tweets.
It is important to note that Botometer does not use any session-
related features, nor does incorporate any notion of activity sessions
[32]: this is important to guarantee that the behavioral differences
that later emerge are not just an artifact of the classifier using
session-based features to separate bots from humans (that would
be circular reasoning).
The distribution of the bot scores is reported in Figure 1. To
limit the risk of wrongly classifying a human account, we chose
to only label as bots those users with a bot score ranking in the
top 5% of the distribution, corresponding to a threshold value of
0.53. This is a conservative strategy informed by the fact that a false
positive, i.e., labelling a human user as a bot, is generally associated
to a higher cost than a false negative, i.e., mislabelling a bot as
human, especially when decisions (such as account suspensions) are
informed by this classification. Furthermore, recent analyses by the
Botometer’s authors demonstrated that, when studying human and
bot interactions, results do not significantly vary in the threshold
range between 0.4 and 0.6 [32]. According to the same conservative
1https://dev.twitter.com/rest/public/search
2https://botometer.iuni.iu.edu/
Figure 1: Frequency distribution of the bot scores obtained
with Botometer. We classified as bots the 5% top scoring ac-
counts, corresponding to a minimum value of 0.53 (green
line). We set instead 0.4 as a threshold (maximum) value for
the labeling of a human. Both choices are informed by pre-
vious analyses and intended to reduce the risk of misclassi-
fications [32].
strategy, we set the threshold for humans to 0.4, leaving unlabeled
all the accounts with a score value between the two thresholds.
Summarizing, we have 19k users labeled as bots and 290k users
labeled as humans, while the reminding 78k are left unlabeled.
To organize the dataset in sessions, the tweets were first grouped
by user and sorted according to the time of posting. A session is a
group of consecutive tweets separated by an amount of time larger
than a certain threshold of T minutes, or in other words, every
time an user posts a tweet after a period of inactivity of at least T
minutes, we say that s/he (or it) has started a new sessions.
To determine the value of T we first considered the distribu-
tion of the inter-time between two consecutive tweets from the
same user, reported in Figure 2. The overall distribution (cf. inset
of Figure 2) displays the characteristic long tail, both for humans
and bots. In human behaviour, this is a common feature, known as
burstiness [19]; observing burstiness among bots does not come as
a surprise either, as the newer, most sophisticated bots are indeed
known to sample their inter-event times from long-tailed distri-
butions, precisely for the purpose of avoiding detection [15, 16].
However, a closer inspection, centred on the typical time range of
a session duration (10 minutes to 2 hours, main figure), highlights
the presence of peaks corresponding to regular values (10 minutes,
a quarter of an hour, half an hour and so forth) and, although the
peaks are present in both distributions, they are significantly more
pronounced in the case of bots.
Also informed by previous studies [20, 29], we set a threshold
value of 60 minutes for our analysis. Additional results, not reported
here, obtained with smaller threshold values (10, 15 and 30 minutes),
show the same qualitative trends. The resulting number of sessions
is more than 250k for the bots and 2.6M for the humans. The fre-
quency distribution of the tweets according to their position in the
session, plotted normalized in Figure 3 to highlight the comparison
between humans and bots, is long tailed, and shows how bots are
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Figure 2: Distribution of the time difference between two
consecutive tweets. The overall distribution (insect) shows
the characteristic long tail for both humans and bots. The
detail of the 10 minutes to 2 hours time range (main figure)
reveals the presence of peaks corresponding to multiples of
5 minutes; the peaks are present both in the humans’ and
bots’ distribution, but they are much more marked in the
latter.
Figure 3: Fraction of tweets appearing in a given position in
the course of a session. Both distributions (bots and humans)
are long-tailed, with the first showing higher values in the
tail, thus indicating that bot are likelier than humans to post
more tweets in the course of a same session (i.e. without a
break of 60 minutes or more).
more likely to engage in longer sessions (with a number of tweets
in the order of the tens or larger).
3 EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS
Once classified the users as bots and humans, and organized the
tweets in sessions, we proceed to study the temporal dynamics of
the two categories of users. Our results are summarized in Figure
4. We focus on four quantities: the fraction of retweets and of
replies among all tweets posted at a certain position in a session;
the number of mentions appearing in a tweet; and the length of the
tweet itself.
As detailed below, the first three of these four features provide
an indicator of the quantity and quality of the social interactions
of an user over the course of a session. The fourth one (text length)
is instead a measure of the amount of content produced by an user.
As correlations between the length of a session and the dynamics
of performance indicators have been observed on social networks
[22, 29], we carry out our analysis on sessions of similar lengths
only (20 to 25 posts), resulting in a total of 1500 bot sessions and
13k human sessions.
A retweet is a repost of a tweet previously posted by another
user. We thus expect to see an increase in the number of human
retweets during the course of a session, as users get exposed to
other users’ posts. The fraction of retweets over the total number of
tweets, grouped by their position in the session, is shown in Figure
4a: in general, the fraction of retweets is higher for humans at all
positions; human users increase their number of retweets over all
the course of their sessions, starting with a rapid increase in the
first 2-3 posts and then slowing down. Such trend is not evident
among bots, that seem instead to oscillate around a constant value.
As a second type of interaction, we consider the reply. The reply,
as the name suggests, is a tweet posted in response to some other
tweet. The same considerations as for the retweets apply here: we
expect to see the fraction of replies increase over the course of a
human sessions. Our results, reported in Figure 4b, confirm our
expectation: as for the retweets, the fraction of replies increases
and decelerates, for humans, over all the first 20 tweets. Bots, on
the other hand, don’t exhibit an analogous increase.
On Twitter, users can mention other users in their post; another
possiblemeasure of social interactions is thus the average number of
mentions per post. As for the previous cases, we expect the number
of mentions to increase, on average, as human users proceed in
their session. The results (Figure 4c) do indeed show an increase in
the average number of mentions by humans over the course of the
first 20 tweets. Again, bots don’t seem to change their behaviour in
the course of the session.
The features analyzed so far are all indicators of the amount of
social interactions in which users engage. We now consider the
average length (in characters) of a tweet, which is a measure of the
amount of content produced and is thus an interesting indicator of
the short-term behavioural dynamics. Before, counting the number
of characters, the tweet is stripped off all urls, mentions and hash-
tags, so to only account for the part of the text effectively composed
by the user. A previous study has failed to show any significant
variation in this quantity over the course of a short-term session
on Twitter [22]; however, analyses of other platforms have shown
that the average post length decreases on similar time scales [29].
Here, the human data show a clear decreasing trend, whereas no
trend emerges for what concerns the bots (see Figure 4d).
Notice that for the last three quantities (replies, mentions and
text length) we have excluded all retweets from our analysis, as
their content is not produced by their poster: whereas the fact itself
of posing a retweet can be considered a behavioural indicator, the
content of the retweet could hardly provide any valuable insight in
this respect.
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(a) Fraction of retweets (b) Fraction of replies
(c) Mentions per tweet (d) Text length
Figure 4: Trend of four different behavioural measures over the course of an online session. All the sessions considered here
contain a similar number of posts (20 to 25) to limit biases due to the different behavioural patterns adopted by users in
sessions of different length [29]. The number of sessions considered is thus 1500 for the bots and 13k for the humans. With
the obvious exception of frame 4a, retweets have been excluded from our analysis, as we are only interested in the original
contend produced by an user. The shaded area corresponds to one SEM, calculated separately for each point. For all measures,
not only the datapoints are well separated between the two categories of users, but humans also show temporal trends which
are not observed in bots. In particular: considering the fraction of retweets (4a), values are higher for human users with respect
to bots over all the course of a session; humans also show an increase in their value, faster in the beginning (first 2-3 tweets),
then slower, but still present during all the first 20 tweets. The situation is similar in the case of replies (4b). Human users
also use more mentions (4c), with a roughly steady increase over the course of a session. Coming to the average length of the
tweets (4d), a decrease is evident for humans, who also post shorter tweets with respect to their automated counterparts. In
all the four measures considered, no clear trend emerges for the case of bots.
In general, our experiments reveal the presence of a temporal
evolution in the human behaviour over the course of a session on
an online social network, whereas, confirming our expectations,
no evidence is found of a similar evolution for bot accounts. In the
next session, we proceed to further investigate the significance of
these temporal trends by incorporating them in a classifier for bot
detection.
4 PREDICTIONS
As the experiments described in the previous section show, hu-
man behaviour over the course of an online session evolves in a
measurably different manner with respect to bot users. To further
investigate this difference, we implement a classifier that, leverag-
ing the quantities considered above, categorizes tweets as either
produced by a bot or a human. Using five different off-the-shelf
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machine learning algorithms, we train our classifier using 10-fold
cross-validation on a dataset of labeled tweets; the dataset, different
from the one analyzed above, consists in three groups of tweets
produced bot account active in as many viral spamming campaigns
at different times, plus a group of human tweets. All accounts are
labeled by human annotators, and a thorough description of the
dataset is provided in [10]. In particular, the groups of accounts
considered here are the ones named ’social spambots #1-3’ and
’genuine accounts’ [10], for a total of circa 3.4M tweets posted by
5k bot accounts and 8.4M tweets posted by 3.5k human accounts.
We proceed to organize the dataset in session separate by 60
minutes intervals, as described in Section 2 above. As a result, each
tweet is tagged with three session features: session id, position of
the tweet in the session and length of the session. Six behavioural
features are also considered: whether the tweet is a retweet, or a
reply, the numbers of mentions, hashtags and urls contained in the
tweet, and the text length. We use the nine features to train four
classifiers, using five different techniques: Decision Trees, Extra
Trees, Random Forest and Adaptive Boosting.
The training and testing of the model is done via 10-fold cross-
validation on the entire dataset. The details are reported in Figure
5; on average over the 10 folds, the AUC scores between 86% and
81% for all models.
As a further verification, for each one of the five models, we
choose the best classifier among the ten obtained in the cross-
validation and test it on the full dataset. The performance, as ex-
pressed by the AUC measure, improves for the DT, the ET and the
RF, raising from 90%, 94% and 94% respectively to 97%, and decreas-
ing for the Ab and the kNN, dropping from 89% to 84%; the ROC
curves are plotted in Figure 6a. However, aside from the details of
the effectiveness of each classifier, the results just described go to
show that short-term behavioural patterns can effectively be used
to inform bot detection.
To quantify precisely the impact of the introduction of the in-
formation concerning the session dynamics, we train four more
classifiers, equivalent to the ones described above in all respects,
except for the set of features used for the training: here only the
behavioural features (retweet, reply, hashtags, mentions, urls, text
length) are included while the three features characterizing the ses-
sion dynamics (session id, position in session, session length) are
left out. The four models (again DT, ET, RF and AB; we omitted kNN,
the slowest to train among all these models, due to time constraints)
are again trained and tested via 10-fold cross-validation. We don’t
report here the details of all the folds, but again we further tested
the best classifier for each method on the whole dataset, and the
corresponding ROC curves are plotted in Figure 6b. The new four
models serve as a baseline to compare the full models to, in order
to get a quantitative indication of the impact of the introduction of
the three session features on the performance of the classifiers. The
difference is particularly pronounced for the first three models (DT,
ET, RF), for which the AUC yields a 83% for the baseline versions,
14 points lower than their counterparts trained with all the nine
features. The AB model also performs worse without the session
features (AUC 80%, compared to the 84% obtained with the full
features).
All the testing of our classifiers was done, until this point, on
the annotated dataset from [10]. As an example of the effectiveness
of leveraging session-level behavioural dynamics for bot detection,
we would now be interested in carrying out some sort of testing
on the dataset of the French election tweets introduced in Section
2. As such dataset lacks annotations, a proper test can not be per-
formed, but we can still exploit the Botometer scores to get some
information about the performance of our classifiers, and again
draw a comparison with the baseline case where session features
are omitted. To this purpose, we let the bot threshold (Botometer
score value above which an account is consider a bot) on all the
range of values between 0 and 1, and for each case compare the
results given by the classifiers, trained on the ’spambots’ dataset as
described above, with these ’annotations’. Again, let us remark that
our purpose here is to evaluate the effectiveness of the introduction
of the feature describing the session dynamics, and not to exactly
evaluate the sensitivity of the classifiers.
The test is performed using the twoAB classifiers, the one trained
with the full features and the baseline one, and the results are shown
in Figure 7. The left part of the graph is not actually very infor-
mative, as when the bot threshold is set below 0.4, the ’positive’
account will actually include many humans. It is roughly in cor-
respondence of the 0.4 value that the true positive rate (TPR) of
the classifier starts increasing , and although the baseline classi-
fier’s TPR increases as well, the former outperforms the latter at all
points.
To summarize, the results exposed in this section show that
features describing the short-term behavioural dynamics of the
users can effectively be employed to implement a bot detection
system or to improve existing ones, thus further confirming that a
difference exists in such dynamics between humans and bots.
5 DISCUSSION
The results detailed in the previous two Sections provide evidence
of the existence of significant differences in the temporal evolution
of behaviour over the course of an online session between human
and bot users.
In particular, in Section 3 we analyze four different indicators of
the users’ behaviour and find, among humans, trends that are not
present among bots: first of all, an increase in the amount of social
interaction, measured as the fraction of retweets, the fraction of
replies, and the number of mentions contained in a tweet; secondly,
a decrease in the amount of content produced, measured as the
average tweet length. Such trends are present up to the 20th post
in human sessions, whereas the same indicators remain roughly
constant for bots. This may be partly due to the fact that, as a
sessions progresses, users grow more tired and become less likely
to perform more complex actions such as composing an entirely
original post [22]. At the same time, we hypothesize that another
possible (and possibly concurring) explanation may be given by the
fact that, as time goes by, users are exposed to more and more posts,
thus increasing their probability to react, for example by retweeting
or by mentioning the author of a previous post. In both cases, bots
would not be affected by such considerations, and no behavioural
change should be expected from them.
It is worth noting again that Botometer does not implement
any notion of activity sessions nor does it use any session-based
features for bot classification [32]. This ensures that the behavioral
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(a) Decision Trees (b) Extra Trees
(c) Random Forests (d) Adaptive Boosting
(e) k Nearest Neighbors
Figure 5: Cross-validation AUC plots for five specific models: 5a Decision Trees (DT), 5b Extra Trees (ET), 5c Random Forests
(RF), 5d Adaptive Boosting (AB) and 5e k Nearest Neighbors (kNN). For all the four models, the plot shows ROC curves and
AUC scores (in legend) for each of the 10 cross-validation folds (thinner lines), and the mean ROC curve (blue line) with its
AUC (in legend) and confidence area (± 1 std, in gray). ET and RF yield the best cross-validated average performance (Mean
AUC=86%), followed by DT and AB (83%) and kNN (81%). 6
(a) Full model (b) Baseline
Figure 6: Area Under the ROC curve plot. We show five models, yielding the highest AUC among the trained ones. Each of the
models exploits three session features in conjunctionwith six behavioural features. Thesemodels all significantly outperform
the baseline models that do not include the three session features derived from our experimental analysis.
Figure 7: Comparison of the performance on the French
election data between the two AB classifiers trained on the
’spambots’ data. One classifier is trained with the full fea-
tures (red circles), while in the training of the other the ses-
sion features are omitted (green squares). The set of ’posi-
tives’ is taken as all the tweets posted by accounts scoring
more than the corresponding Botometer score (horizontal
axis), and could indeed contain some human accounts, es-
pecially for lower values. Nonetheless, the higher TPR goes
to show that the introduction of the session features signif-
icantly improves the performance of the classifier.
differences highlighted in this work are genuine and not simply
an artifact due to discriminating on features used for classification
purposes (that would be circular reasoning).
In Section 4, we use the results obtained in Section 3 to inform
a classification system for bot detection. Our purpose there is to
highlight how the introduction of features describing the session
dynamics (session id, position of the tweet in the session and length
of the session) can substantially improve the performance of the
detector. To this purpose, we use a range of different machine
learning techniques (Decision Trees, Extra Trees, Random Forests,
Adaptive Boosting, k Nearest Neighbors) to train, through 10-fold
cross-validation, two different set of classifier: one including the
features describing the session dynamics (the full model), and one
without those features (the baseline). The comparison between the
two sets of models, carried out both on the annotated dataset user
for the cross-validation and on the dataset of tweets concerning the
French elections, show that the full model significantly outperforms
the baseline.
6 RELATEDWORK
Although bots in some rare occasions have been used for social
good, e.g., to deliver positive interventions and interactions [26, 27],
their use is mostly associated with malicious operations. Bots, for
example, have been involved with social media manipulation of
political conversation [4, 18, 21, 24, 35], the spread of disinforma-
tion and fake news [15, 28], conspiracy [31] and extremist propa-
ganda [14, 17], as well as stock market manipulation [13].
The increasing evidence brought our research community to
propose a wealth of techniques to address the challenges posed by
the pervasive presence of bots in platforms like Facebook and Twit-
ter. Social bot detection is one such example. A recent review [16]
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suggested to classify bot detection approaches under three classes:
(a) methods based on social network structure and dynamics; (b)
systems based on crowd-sourcing and human annotations; (c) learn-
ing algorithms based on informative features that separate bots
from humans. Our work differentiates from this literature as it is
not directly aimed at bot detection, yet our findings can be used to
inform detection based on bot and human features and behaviors.
The study of bots’ characteristic is another recent research thread
that attracted much attention. Researchers discovered that bots ex-
hibit a variety of diverse behaviors, capabilities, and intents [25, 32].
A recent technical memo illustrated novel directions in bot de-
sign that leverage Artificial Intelligence (AI): AI bots can generate
media and textual content of quality potentially similar to human-
generated content but at much larger scale, completely automati-
cally [2]. In this work, we highlighted similarities and dissimilarities
between bots’ and humans’ behavioral characteristics, illustrating
the current state of bots’ capabilities.
Provided that bots oftentimes operate in concert (botnets), this
attracted the attention of the cybersecurity research community.
Examples of such botnets have been revealed on Twitter [1, 12].
Botnet detection is still in its early stage, however much work as-
sumed unrestricted access to social media platform infrastructure.
Different social media providers, for example, applied bot detection
techniques in the back-end of other platforms, like Facebook [5, 30]
and Renren (a chinise Twitter-like social platform) [33, 36]. Al-
though these approaches can be valuable and show promising re-
sults [3, 6, 30], for example to detect large-scale bot infiltration, they
can be implemented exclusively by social media service providers
with full access to data and system infrastructure.
Researchers in academic groups who don’t have unrestricted
access to social media data and systems, proposed many alternative
techniques that can work well with smaller samples of user activ-
ity, and fewer labelled examples of bots and humans. The research
presented here is one such example. Other examples include the clas-
sification system proposed by Chu et al. [7, 8], the crowd-sourcing
detection framework by Wang et al. [34], the NLP-based detection
methods by Clark et al. [9], and the BotOrNot classifier [11].
Some historical user activity data is still needed for thesemethods
to function properly, either by indirect data collection [7–9, 23, 34],
or, like in the case of BotOrNot [11], by interrogating the Twitter
API (which imposes strict rate limits, making it impossible to do
large-scale bot detection). Given these limits, we believe that it
is very valuable to have a deep understanding of human and bot
behavioral performance dynamics: our findings can inform data
collection and annotation strategies, can help improve classification
accuracy by injecting expert knowledge and produce better, more
informative and predictive features, and ultimately allow for a better
understanding of interaction mechanisms online.
7 CONCLUSIONS
In the present work we have investigated the behavioral dynamics
of social network users over the course of an online session, with
particular attention to the differences emerging between human
and bot accounts under this perspective. User session dynamics
have been investigated in the literature before but, to the best of
our knowledge, never applied to the problem of bot detection.
Our analysis revealed the presence of behavioral trends at the
session level among humans that are not observed in bot accounts.
We hypothesized two possible mechanisms motivating such trends:
on one side, humans’ performance deteriorates as they engage
in prolonged online sessions; this decline has been attributed to
a cognitive origin in related work. On the other hand, over the
course of their online activity, humans are constantly exposed to
posts and messages by other users, so their probability to engage in
social interaction increases. Devisingmethods to further test each of
these two hypotheses could possibly constitute an avenue for future
research. Furthermore, the presence of such behavioral differences
between the two categories of users can be exploited to improve bot
detection techniques. To investigate this possibility, we trained two
categories of classifiers, in one case including features describing the
session dynamics, while omitting them in the other. The comparison
shows that session features bring an increase of up to 14% AUC,
thus substantially improving the performance of the bot detectors.
This suggests that features inspired by cognitive dynamics can be
useful indicators of human activity signatures, which may be harder
to replicate by bots. Importantly, the adopted classifier does not
leverage any session-related features, thus ensuring that the results
we observe are genuine and not the artifact of circular reasoning. It
may be an interesting object of future work to better characterize
the interplay between the features studied here and other features
leveraged by various bot detection techniques, such as the ones
mentioned in the "Related Work" Section.
Overall, our study contributes both to the ongoing investigation
around the detection and characterization of social bots, and to
the understanding of online human behaviour, specifically in its
short-term dynamical evolution over the course of activity sessions.
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